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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
purchase price within two years, with $15 per month as compensation
for the loan. The parents made improvements on the property and
paid interest on the loan, and sought specific performance on payment
of the purchase price. Appellant contended that the oral agreement
was void as not to be performed within one year. The case was
affirmed on the ground that the trust relation existing and part performance defeated the claim that the agreement was oral and therefore
void as not to be performed within a year. The agreement could have
been performed within a year, since by its terms payment of the $1,800
could have been made at any time within two years and so was outside
of the statute, but the Court did not decide that question. In this case
respondents paid interest, entered upon the premises and made improvements thereon. It is a stronger case of part performance than the
Hendry case, supra. But, nevertheless, in so far as the decision in the
Borrow case, supra, is based on part performance, it would seem to be
overruled by the Hendry case. It is to be noted, however, that no
mention of the Borrow decision was made by the Court in deciding the
Hendry case.
The case of Maze v. Feuchtwanger'0 dealt with an. agreement to
pay a commission on a sale of goods in consideration of the agent's
release of an option permitting a sale to another. The Court held
that the agreement was not within the statute of frauds, since performance was possible within a year because no time was fixed, especially
where it was fully executed on the part of the promisee. The Court's
contention of part performance is mere dicta, and the dicta would seem,
at first sight, overruled by the Hendry case, supra. However, it is to be
noted that in the Hendry case neither party could have or did perform
his part of the contract within a year; while in the Maze case, supra,
assuming that the commission was not to be paid within a year, the
promisee could have and did fully perform within the year.
In conclusion, it is to be repeated that the case of Hendry v. Bird,
supra, is a clear and convincing decision, to the effect that where an
oral agreement, contract or promise is void by reason of the fact that
it may not by its terms be performed within one year from the making
thereof, part performance will not take it outside of the statute.
J. Orrin Vining.
THE "BUT FOR" RULE IN WASHINGTON-The question of proximate cause is one which is of vital importance in determining where
the liability for an act or omission shall fall. For this reason certain
attempts have been made to set forth rules which should determine
whether an act was the proximate cause of a particular result. The socalled "But For" rule for determining proximate cause is an outgrowth
of this class of litigation and has been the cause of several interesting
and apparently none too well reasoned cases, of which the famous "Bear
Case" or Gilman v. Noyes' is perhaps the best known.
" 106 Wash. 327, 179 Pae. 850 (1919).
'Gilmann v. Noyes, 57 N. H. 697 (1876).

NOTES AND COMMENT
The true "But For" rule is simply this: the defendant's tort is the
legal cause of the plaintiff's damage if, but for the commission of the defendant's tort, the damage would not have happened. It seems that
the limitations of this rule have not always been understood.
In the recent Washington case of Ross v. Smith & Bloxom 2 the Court
purported to decide the case upon the basis of the "But For" rule
and cited several Washington cases8 in support of its position. The
decision does not in fact, however, sustain the true "But For" rule
and each of the Washington cases cited as sustaining it was correctly
decided upon other grounds than that which the Court infers.
The statement which has caused the case of Ross v. Smith & Bloxom
to be cited as sustaining the "But For" rule is as follows:
"The act, to be the proximate cause of the injury must have been
such that without it the injury would not have happened. 29 Cyc. 489."
No fault can be found with this- statement of the law but this
statement is not authority for the usually accepted "But For" rule
defined above. It is only by using inverse reasoning that such a statement can lend color to the view that when a thing would not have
happened but for a certain act or omission, that act or omission must
have been the proximate cause of the consequence. The statement as
quoted in the case, supra, is merely an abstract statement that one of
the things necessary to a proximate cause is that the act must have contributed in some way to the consequence.
One might suppose from the extract quoted from SEDGWICK ON
DAMAGES 4 that this great writer supported the "But For" rule. The
extract quoted is as follows:
"The defendant may have suffered injury and a causal connection
between the two may have been proved, but obviously this is not
enough, for there are other causes which have contributed to produce
the loss or damage. The essential point in law is that the connection
must be proved to be necessary; the negligence must be a cause but for
which the injury would not have been suffered.
This statement, if construed, is to the effect that it is essential to
proximate cause that the result would not have happened but for
the negligence of the defendant, but it gives this as a negative test, and
not as a positive test of what is proximate, and what is not proximate
cause.
The Court fails to quote the rest of the paragraph from SEDGWICK
which reads:
"This 'But For' rule, which is frequently mistaken for a decisive
test may be expressed as follows:- The proximate cause to which legal
liability attaches must be a cause but for which the loss or damage
would not have arisen.
But the causal chain is a legal conception, abstracted from the infinite web of cause and effect, as it
appears and vanishes in nature, formed for the purpose of attaching
IRoss v. Smith 4 Blozom, 107 Wash. 493, 182 Pac. 582 (1919).
'Bullis v.Ball, 98 Wash. 342, 167 Pac. 942 (1917) Hellem v. Bupply Laundry Co., 94 Wash. 683, 163 Pac. 9 (1917).
SDw
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legal responsibility to a human agent, and in this chain, to say that a
cause satisfies the 'But For' rule is not to say that it is the proximate
cause since it may easily be a remote cause. Two entirely independent
conditions must be satisfied. First, to be the proximate and to entail
legal responsibility a cause must be one but for which the result would
not have happened. Second, not only must this test be satisfied, but also
this cause must be active enough in the result for it to be regarded
in the law as efficient in responsibility"
From the paragraph as a whole it can readily be seen that SEDGWCK
by no means supports the true "But For" rule.
In the last analysis the "But For" rule cannot be called a rule
in any true sense of that word, it being nothing more than a limitation in a negative way on what may be the proximate cause of a
consequence. The real test and the thing which must always be decided,
is not whether the result would not have happened but for the particular
act, but whether that act is close enough in connection and causation to
the result to be termed the proximate or efficient cause of the consequence. When this fact is determined in the affirmative, it must
always follow that the "But For" rule will apply to the case. The
error, however, arises in supposing that this same rule will apply
inversely, so as to say that if a thing would not have happened but for
a particular act, then that act must be the proximate cause of the result.
The fallacy of this line of reasoning may be seen in the fact that if this
were true everything would be traceable back indefinitely as Ladd, J.,
in the case of Gilman v. Noyes, supra, states:
"Obviously the number of events in the history not only of those
individual bears, but of their progenitors clear back to the pair that in
instinctive obedience to the divine command went in unto Noah in the
ark, of which it may be said, but for this the sheep would not have

been killed, is simply without limit."
A rule that would lead to such results as this is certainly not to be

followed and in fact is not followed in Washington.
Taking up briefly the cases cited by the Supreme Court in the case
of Ross v. Smith & Bloxom, supra, as sustaining the "But For" rule it
may readily be shown that these cases were not decided upon the basis of
the "But For" rule.
The case of Bullis v. Ball5 was not decided upon ground of the
"But For" rule but upon the ground laid down by the Court as follows:

"Assuming that § 24 of the ordinance, requiring the driver to
keep his vehicle as near the right hand curb as possible applies to street
intersections, and that the defendant upon the occasion in question
failed to observe the ordinance in this respect and hence was guilty
of negligence, it seems too plain for argument that there was absolutely no causal connection between the act of negligence growing out
of the violation of the ordinance and the collision. Clearly this negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury "
98 Wash. 349 167 Pac. 942 (1917).

NOTES AND COMMENT
In the case of Hellen v. Supply Laundry Co." two drivers, both
exceeding the speed limit met at a street intersection and one car suddenly swerving from the instinctive action of the driver in attempting
to avoid the accident, hit an innocent third person. The action was
by the innocent third person against the drivers of the two machines.
One driver, the one who swerved and actually hit the plaintiff having
died since the accident, this action was prosecuted against the person
who caused him to swerve.
The Court in this case arrived at a very correct and rightly reasoned
decision which was worked out on the theory that the defendant had
placed the other driver in a position where his instinct came into action
and that instinct was the force which turned the car and caused the
accident. Therefore there was a direct line of causation between the
wrong of the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff. The speed of
the defendant placed the other driver in a position where his instinct
came into play and the original wrong working through this instinct
caused the car to swerve and hit the plaintiff. Consequently the defendant's wrong was the proximate cause of the injury.
Thus by making an analysis of the cases cited by the Court in sustaining the "But For" rule in Washington the conclusion is reached
that the Court of this state does not support the "But For" rule but
has used it correctly as one of the limitations to determine proximate
cause. The important test is always whether there is a causal connection between the act and the result. A good statement of the whole
problem is contained in the case of Crowley v. City of West End et al.
where Anderson, J., gives the following"To constitute actionable negligence, there must be not only causal
connection between the negligence complained of and the injury suffered, but the connection must be by a natural and urbroken sequence,without intervening efficient causes, so that, but for the negligence of
the defendant, the injury would not have occurred. It must not only
be a cause, but it must be the proximate, that is, the direct and immediate, efficient cause of the injury."
The "But For" rule then, is never a positive test of what is the
proximate cause and is in no way decisive on the question of proximate cause, but is merely a limitation in a negative way of what may be
the proximate cause. If used in this way this so called "rule" is
harmless.
Gerald Arthur De Garmo.
t

Hellen v. Supply Laundry Co., note 3, supra.
Crowley v. City of West End, 149 Ala. 613, 43 So. 359, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.)

801 (1907).

